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Note
Davis v. Davis: The Embryonic Stages of
Procreational Privacy
I. Introduction
The Tennessee Supreme Court has, in an unprecedented
decision, extended constitutional protection of procreational pri-
vacy to include the right to avoid procreation after a human em-
bryo is intentionally created outside of the womb.' The case of
Davis v. Davis2 involved a custody dispute over seven "frozen
embryos" that had been created by the parties prior to their di-
vorce.3 Although Tennessee's highest court weighed the rela-
tive interests of the gamete-donors, 4 the court concluded that
the party wishing to avoid genetic parenthood should prevail, so
long as the other party had a "reasonable possibility" of achiev-
ing parenthood through other means.5
1. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992), reh'g denied in part,
granted in part, No. 34, 1992 WL 341632 (Sup. Ct. Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992), cert. de-
nied, Stowe v. Davis, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993). A human embryo may be created
outside of the womb in a process called in vitro fertilization. See infra part II.B. In
this Note, the term "embryo" will be used interchangeably with the term "preem-
bryo," although the American Fertility Society has adopted the position that up to
approximately two weeks after fertilization, the proper term for a zygote is "preem-
bryo," as distinct from an embryo. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 593. See infra note 82 and
accompanying text.
2. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
3. Id. at 589. Embryos may be "frozen" in liquid nitrogen in a process called
cryopreservation. See infra part II.B.
4. A gamete is "a mature sexual reproductive cell, [such] as a sperm or egg,
which unites with another cell to form a new organism." RANDOM HOUSE DICTION-
ARY 582 (Unabridged ed. 1979).
5. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604. The holding of the court is limited to situations
where the parties had not entered into a prior contingency agreement. Id. at 597;
see infra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
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As procreational technology advances,6 issues such as the
one presented to the Tennessee Supreme Court will become in-
creasingly important.7 Tennessee is the first state to directly
address the specific right to avoid genetic parenthood8 after con-
ception. 9 Although the United States Supreme Court has de-
nied certiorari in Davis,'0 advances in biological technology and
changing ideas about the nature of parenthood indicate that it
will only be a matter of time before the Court addresses this
issue.
This Note discusses the importance of the Tennessee
Supreme Court's constitutional evaluation of the right to avoid
genetic parenthood. Part II traces the history of United States
Supreme Court procreational privacy decisions, explains the
process of in vitro fertilization, and addresses the legal status of
preembryos, the products of in vitro fertilization. Part III sets
forth the controversy which gave rise to the Davis litigation and
details the decisions at the three Tennessee court levels. Part
IV notes that the right to avoid genetic parenthood has not been
held a "fundamental" right by the United States Supreme
Court, and explains why the Supreme Court would most likely
refuse to recognize such a right. Part V concludes with a pre-
6. See generally Jean M. Eggen, The "Orwellian Nightmare" Reconsidered: A
Proposed Regulatory Framework for the Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 25
GA. L. REv. 625 (1991).
7. See generally John A. Robertson, Decisional Authority Over Embryos and
Control of IVF Technology, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 285 (1988).
8. A "genetic parent" has been described as "an individual who contributes a
gamete resulting in a conception." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (Michie 1992, effective
July 17, 1993). However, this paper addresses an individual's interest in avoiding
genetic parenthood after conception has occurred. Therefore, for the purposes of
this paper, a "genetic parent" means an individual who contributes genetic mate-
rial that results in a live birth. This is distinguishable from the traditional notion
of a parent, which "comprehends much more than the mere fact of who was respon-
sible for a child's conception and birth and is commonly understood to describe and
refer to person or persons who share mutual love and affection with a child and
who supply child support and maintenance, instruction, discipline and guidance."
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Solberg v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 185 N.W.2d 319, 323 (Wis. 1971)). See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1253-
54 (N.J. 1988) ("[t]he custody, care, companionship, and nurturing that follow
birth are not parts of the right to procreation").
9. The Davis court noted that "[p]reviously, courts have dealt with the child-
bearing and child-rearing aspects of parenthood. Abortion cases have dealt with
gestational parenthood. In this case, the Court must deal with the question of
genetic parenthood." Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603.
10. Stowe v. Davis, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).
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diction of the future of procreational privacy in the United
States.
II. Background
A. The History of Procreational Privacy Under the United
States Constitution
The United States Supreme Court decisions addressing
procreational privacy have focused upon an individual's affirm-
ative right to procreate," to use contraception to prevent preg-
nancy, 12 and to have an abortion once pregnancy has occurred.' 3
The Supreme Court has not specifically focused upon the right
to avoid genetic parenthood once a human embryo is created
outside of the womb.' 4
The fundamental right to become a parent has long been
recognized by the Supreme Court. In Meyer v. Nebraska,'6 the
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of "lib-
erty" encompasses the right to raise children.' 6 The Court rein-
forced this concept in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 7 where the Court
invalidated a law compelling the sterilization of criminals.' 8 In
11. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
12. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
13. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Webster v. Re-
productive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Akron v. Akron Ctr. For Reprod.
Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. Clifton Perry & L. Kristen Schneider, Cryopreserved Embryos: Who Shall
Decide Their Fate?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 463, 473 (1992); see also Warren A. Kaplan,
Fetal Research Statutes, Procreative Rights, and the 'New Biology: Living In The
Interstices Of The Law, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 723 (1987).
15. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Meyer, the Court reversed the conviction of a
teacher for teaching German to young children. Id. Justice McReynolds wrote
that "liberty" denoted "not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men." Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
16. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XIV, § 1.
17. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
18. Id. At issue in Skinner was the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Steriliza-
tion Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 171-195 (West 1935). This statute, which
3
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Skinner, the Court held that the right to procreate is "one of the
basic civil rights of man,"19 and that any law depriving an indi-
vidual of that right must be strictly scrutinized. 20
Although the right to procreate has been recognized by the
Court since 1923, the right to avoid procreation was not explic-
itly recognized until 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut.21 At is-
sue in Griswold were two Connecticut statutes which prohibited
the use of contraceptives. 22 The opinion, written by Justice
Douglas, cites several constitutional provisions which create
"zones of privacy."23 The Griswold Court held that these zones
of privacy encompassed marital and sexual relationships, 24 and
that state regulations could not "sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of [those] protected freedoms."25
In the following years, the Court strengthened and elabo-
rated upon the concept of procreational privacy. In Eisenstadt
v. Baird,26 the Court invalidated two Massachusetts statutes27
which granted married persons, but not single persons, access
to contraceptives. 28 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
stated with strong conviction: "[i]f the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
mandated sterilization of a person after two felony convictions involving "moral
turpitude," but excluded certain felonies such as embezzlement, was found uncon-
stitutional. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
19. Id. at 541.
20. Id.
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22. The two statutes at issue were CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32, repealed by 1969
CoNN. PUB. AcTs 828, and CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 54-196, repealed by 1969 CoNN.
PuB. ACTS 828, § 214. Section 53-32 provided that "[any person who uses any
drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception
shall be fined ... or imprisoned," CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (repealed 1969); and
§ 54-196 provided that "any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or
commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he
were the principal offender," CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 54-196 (repealed 1969).
23. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. Among the provisions listed were the First
Amendment's right of association, the Third Amendment's prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers, the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause. Id.
24. Id. at 485-86.
25. Id. at 485.
26. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
27. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 272, §§ 21-21A (West 1990).
28, 405 U.S. at 454-55.
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so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child."29 This belief was the basis for the Court's
decision in Roe v. Wade,30 which set the standard for procrea-
tional privacy for nearly two decades to follow.
The Roe Court reaffirmed the concept of zones of privacy
created by the Constitution3' and held that the zones were
"broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy."32 The Court noted, however, that
the right to terminate a pregnancy was not absolute and there-
fore should be weighed against any state interest.33 A state's
interest in protecting a fetus was, according to the Court, com-
pelling at the point at which a fetus became viable. 34 At that
point a state could regulate and even proscribe abortion. 35
The Court has not specifically addressed whether there is a
fundamental right to avoid genetic parenthood after conception.
The issue has been surreptitiously presented to the Court in
abortion cases considering a father's right to decide the fate of
his unborn fetus. 36 However, the Court has in the past summa-
rily dismissed the issue of a father's rights, because of a wo-
29. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. Id. at 152.
32. Id. at 153.
33. Id. at 154-55. "Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court
has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compel-
ling state interest' .... " Id. at 155.
34. Id. at 163. The Roe Court stated that a fetus was "viable" at the point at
which it could potentially "live outside of the mother's womb, albeit with artificial
aid." Id. at 160.
35. Id. at 163-64. The Roe Court set forth what has come to be known as the
"trimester framework":
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the
abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of
the pregnant woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester,
the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it
chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related
to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest
in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even pro-
scribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judg-
ment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.
Id. at 164-65.
36. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (holding a
state's spousal notice provision unconstitutional); Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
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man's overriding rights of privacy, bodily integrity, and
autonomy. 37 Thus, both spousal consent and spousal notice pro-
visions have consistently been deemed unconstitutional by the
United States Supreme Court.
For example, in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth38 the
Court considered, inter alia, a husband's interest in his wife's
decision to abort a fetus. 39 The Court held that the spousal con-
sent provision in Missouri's abortion statute40 was unconstitu-
tional, reasoning that a "state cannot 'delegate to a spouse a
veto power which the state itself is absolutely and totally pro-
hibited from exercising during the first trimester of preg-
nancy.' "41 Moreover,
[t]he obvious fact is that when the wife and the husband disagree
on [the decision to abort], the view of only one of the two marriage
partners can prevail. Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically
bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately af-
fected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs
in her favor. 42
In concurrence, Justice Stewart noted that the majority too
quickly discounted the issue of a husband's interest in his un-
born fetus.43 He stated:
the primary issue [raised] is whether the [s]tate may constitution-
ally recognize and give effect to a right on [the father's] part to
participate in the decision to abort a jointly conceived child. This
seems to me a rather more difficult problem than the Court ac-
knowledges. Previous decisions have recognized that a man's
forth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding a state's spousal consent provision
unconstitutional).
37. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67-72. See Stefanie L. Black, Comment, Competing
Interests in the Fetus: A Look Into Paternal Rights After Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 28 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 987 (1993) (examining the issue of paternal rights
and its treatment in the courts).
38. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
39. Id. at 69. "We are not unaware of the deep and proper concern and inter-
est that a devoted and protective husband has in his wife's pregnancy and in the
growth and development of the fetus she is carrying." Id.
40. Mo. ANN. STAT § 188.020(3) (Vernon 1974).
41. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F.
Supp. 1362, 1375 (E.D. Mo. 1975)). The state's inability to prohibit abortion dur-
ing the first trimester was created in the Roe decision. See supra notes 30-35 and
accompanying text.
42. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71.
43. Id. at 90 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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right to father children and enjoy the association of his offspring
is a constitutionally protected freedom."
Justices White and Rehnquist added in their dissent that the
issue was not, as the majority claimed, whether the state could
delegate to another its interest in the potential life of a fetus,
but rather, whether the Court should recognize a husband's in-
terest in the life of his wife's fetus.45
In a dissent from City of Akron v. Center For Reproductive
Health,46 Justice O'Connor warned that the Roe framework was
inherently tied to medical technology, and that a state's interest
in potential life existed as much at the beginning of pregnancy
as it did at viability.47 This criticism of the Roe trimester frame-
work has steadily been adopted by the majority of the Court.
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,48 the Court ac-
knowledged that the trimester system was "unsound in princi-
44. Id. (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that an unmar-
ried father has a right to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before he could be
deprived of parenthood); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See supra
notes 17-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of Skinner).
45. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 93 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent continued:
[iut by no means follows, from the fact that the mother's interest in deciding
"whether or not to terminate her pregnancy" outweighs the State's interest
in the potential life of the fetus, that the husband's interest is also out-
weighed and may not be protected by the State. A father's interest in hav-
ing a child-perhaps his only child-may be unmatched by any other
interest in his life.
Id. (citing Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651).
46. 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In City of Akron, the Court
held several provisions of an Ohio abortion statute unconstitutional, including pro-
visions requiring: 1) that any abortion after the first trimester of pregnancy be
performed in a hospital, id. at 431-33; 2) parental consent for minors under the age
of fifteen, id. at 439-42; 3) informed consent from the woman obtaining the abor-
tion, id. at 442-44; and 4) a 24-hour waiting period prior to the abortion, id. at
449-51. Similar provisions have recently been deemed constitutional in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). See infra notes 56-70 and accompa-
nying text.
47. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 452, 459 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
48. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). The Court in Webster upheld the constitutionality of
a Missouri abortion statute, Mo. ANN. STAT. ch. 188 (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1993),
which contained a preamble that stated that the "life of each human being begins
at conception," prohibited the use of public facilities or employees to perform abor-
tions, and required physicians to conduct viability tests prior to performing abor-
tions. Webster, 492 U.S. at 504-21. The Court refused to examine the
constitutionality of the statute's preamble, because the preamble "[did] not by its
terms regulate abortion or any other aspect of appellee's medical practice." Id. at
506.
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ple and unworkable in practice."49 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who authored the Webster opinion, objected to the framework
because it was inconsistent with the "notion of a Constitution
cast in general terms and usually speaking in general princi-
ples."50 The Chief Justice further stated that "[t]he key ele-
ments of the Roe framework-trimesters and viability-are not
found in the text of the Constitution or in any place else one
would expect to find a constitutional principle."51 The Webster
Court also echoed the concern previously expressed by Justice
White in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth5 2 that the framework
rendered the Supreme Court the country's "ex officio" medical
board, with powers to approve or disapprove medical and opera-
tive practices and standards throughout the United States.53
Acknowledging that a state's interest in protecting potential life
existed before the point of viability,54 the Court modified and
narrowed Roe, but avoided an explicit overruling by distin-
guishing the facts at issue in the two cases. 55
Recently, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,56 the Court con-
summated its departure from the Roe framework while reaf-
firming what it deemed to be the central holding of Roe.5 7 The
Casey Court upheld provisions of Pennsylvania's Abortion Con-
trol Act 58 which required, as prerequisites to obtaining an abor-
49. Webster, 492 U.S. at 518 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985)).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
53. Webster, 492 U.S. at 518-19 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 99 (White, J., dissenting)).
54. Id. at 519. "[W]e do not see why the state's interest in protecting potential
human life should come into existence only at the point of viability." Id.
55. Id. at 521. The Court emphasized that the Missouri statute determined
viability to be the point at which Missouri's interest in potential human life was
compelling, whereas the Texas statute in Roe criminalized the performance of all
abortions, unless the life of the mother was endangered. Id.
56. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
57. The Casey opinion set forth what it deemed to be the essential holding of
Roe: 1) a woman has a fundamental right to choose to have an abortion, without
undue interference from the state, before the viability of her fetus; 2) a state has
the power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, provided that the law contains
exceptions for pregnancies which endanger a woman's life or health; 3) the state
has legitimate interests from conception in protecting the health of the woman and
the life of the fetus. Id. at 2803-16.
58. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203-3220 (1990).
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tion: 1) informed consent;59 2) a twenty-four-hour waiting
period;60 and 3) parental consent with a judicial bypass.61 The
Court struck down the statute's spousal notice provision,62 but
acknowledged a husband's "'deep and proper concern and inter-
est... in his wife's pregnancy and in the growth and develop-
ment of the fetus she is carrying.'"63
Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality, stated that it
was settled law that the Constitution limits a state's "right to
interfere with a person's most basic decisions about family and
parenthood, as well as bodily integrity."64 She elaborated fur-
ther by recognizing that the "law affords constitutional protec-
tion to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and educa-
tion."65 Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor classified Roe as an "ex-
tension" of the cases protecting personal liberties, and noted
that "[tihe extent to which the legislatures of the States might
act to outweigh the interests of the woman in choosing to termi-
nate her pregnancy was a subject of debate in Roe itself and in
decisions following it."66
Although the Casey Court acknowledged that there was a
realm of personal liberty within which the government could
not constitutionally intrude, the Court reiterated that a state
may override a woman's right to an abortion at fetal viability.67
59. Id. § 3205.
60. Id.
61. Id. § 3206.
62. Id. § 3209.
63. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69). The Casey
Court held that the spousal notice provision imposed an undue burden on a wo-
man's right to obtain an abortion and was therefore unconstitutional, because of
the disparate effects of a pregnancy upon the liberty of men and women due to
their biological differences, and because the prevalence of domestic violence ren-
dered the provision a "substantial obstacle" to women seeking an abortion. Id. at
2799-2800.
64. 112 S. Ct. at 2806 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Washing-
ton v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990); Wintston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)).
65. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807 (citing Carey, 431 U.S. at 685).
66. Id. at 2808.
67. Id. at 2816-22.
1994] 575
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The Court then abolished the trimester framework after deter-
mining that it did not sufficiently recognize the state's interest
in the potential lives of fetuses.68 Justice O'Connor formulated
an "undue burden" standard to replace the trimester system,
which had effectively prevented any state interference with the
abortion decision during the first trimester.69 The Court held:
[t]o promote the State's profound interest in potential life,
throughout pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure
that the woman's choice is informed, and measures designed to
advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their pur-
pose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.
These measures must not be an undue burden on the right.70
The United States Supreme Court has noticeably changed
its views regarding abortion since Roe v. Wade. Although the
Court still recognizes the fundamental privacy right of a woman
to obtain an abortion, it is clear that changing medical technolo-
gies,71 as well as the changing constituency of the Court,7 2 have
68. Id. at 2818.
69. Id. at 2820.
70. Id. at 2799. The Court explained that a regulation was an "undue burden"
if it had "the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman
seeking an abortion." Id.
71. Fetuses are capable of life outside of the mother's womb at earlier and
earlier stages as technology advances. See Chris Macaluso, Comment, Viability
and Abortion, 64 Ky. L.J. 146, 160-62 (1975). The Court in Roe v. Wade defined
viability as the point at which the fetus is "potentially able to live outside of the
womb, albeit with artificial aid." Roe, 410 U.S. at 160. Many states have adopted
this definition. See, e.g., ARuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2301.01(D) (1992); IDAHO
CODE § 18-604(7) (1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.1(3) (West 1992); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit 22, § 1598(2)(B) (West 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-326(6)
(1991).
72. One of several highly-publicized aspects of the Clarence Thomas hearings
focused upon the fact that Justice Thomas refused to state his position on abortion.
Al Kamen, Center-Right Coalition Asserts Itself Moderates O'Connor, Kennedy,
Souter Are Reagan-Bush Appointees, WASH. POST, June 30, 1992, at Al. Not sur-
prisingly, Justice Thomas joined with Justices Rehnquist and Scalia in their Casey
dissent and urged the explicit overruling of Roe v. Wade. Id. However, it is ex-
pected that, "[bly replacing conservatives, [President] Clinton could make the
Court more liberal on abortion . . . ." Inside Politics (CNN television broadcast,
Nov. 5, 1992). President Clinton has already replaced conservative Justice White
with Ruth Bader Ginsberg, a pro-choice advocate. See Harriet Chiang, Ginsberg
Speaks Up For Women's Rights, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 9, 1993, at A2. Further, Justice
Blackmun has recently announced his retirement and must be replaced. Such a
change in constituency, while safeguarding a woman's right to abortion, may not
necessarily affect in vitro fertilization, and the issue at bar. See infra part V.
576 [Vol. 14:567
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made the Court increasingly willing to recognize a state's as-
serted interest in protecting the potentiality of life.
B. The Process of In Vitro Fertilization
The first successful birth of a child produced by in vitro fer-
tilization (IVF) was in 1978. 73 Since then, IVF programs have
rapidly increased.7 4 IVF provides an opportunity for procrea-
tion to couples hindered by many forms of infertility.7 5
The process of IVF may be divided into five steps: 1) pa-
tient screening, 2) ovulation induction and monitoring, 3) ova
aspiration, 4) in vitro fertilization, and 5) embryo transfer.7 6 Af-
ter a patient has been accepted into an IVF program, the pro-
cess begins with the injection of chemicals or human hormones
into a woman's ovaries to stimulate ovulation and produce mul-
tiple eggs.7 7 Once a patient's estrogen has increased, the physi-
cian causes eggs to release from the ovarian follicles, again by
administering a drug.78 The eggs are subsequently removed via
laparoscopy79 and placed into a dish, to which the donor's sperm
is added.80 Two to four days after fertilization and cell divi-
sion,8' the physician injects the preembryo 2 into the woman's
73. Melvin G. Dodson et al., A Detailed Program Review of In Vitro Fertiliza-
tion With a Discussion and Comparison of Alternative Approaches, 162 SURGERY,
GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 89, 89 (Jan. 1986).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 90.
77. Id. All cycles are stimulated by clomiphene citrate, human menopausal
gonadotropin, followed by human chorionic gonadotropin. Id. The production of
multiple eggs is sometimes referred to as "superovulation." John A. Robertson,
Decisional Authority Over Embryos And Control of IVF Technology, 28
JURIMETRICS J. 285, 286-87 (1988).
78. Kaplan, supra note 14, at 727. The drug administered is human chorionic
gonadotropin. Dodson et al., supra note 73, at 90.
79. Kaplan, supra note 14, at 727. "A laparoscopy is a procedure performed
under anesthesia in which the physician places two tubes in the woman's abdomen
near the naval .... The doctor then observes the ovary through a scope attached to
one of the tubes .... A hollow needle is then passed through the other tube and the
eggs are aspirated out of the body cavity." Id. n.17.
80. Id. at 727.
81. Id. at 727-28. Most preembryos are transferred to the cervical canal at the
four to eight-cell stage. See Dodson et al., supra note 73, at 101-02.
82. The American Fertility Society has adopted the position that at the eight-
cell stage the aggregation of human cells is still a zygote and has not yet developed
the singleness of one person; therefore, up to approximately two weeks after fertil-
ization, the proper term for a zygote is "preembryo," as distinct from an embryo.
1994] 577
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cervical canal with a syringe-like catheter. 83 Implantation will
occur, if at all, within two weeks after transfer.84
"Cryopreservation" is the maintenance of preembryos or
other excised tissue at extremely low temperatures.8 5 When
multiple eggs are produced through superovulation,88 those not
implanted are fertilized, frozen, and saved for use at a later
date.87 Cryopreservation can increase the chances of preg-
nancy, and is less invasive and less expensive than retrieving
additional ova from the woman.88
The success rate of achieving pregnancy through IVF is
low. 89 There is evidence that the likelihood of a successful preg-
nancy increases when multiple embryos are transferred at one
time.90
C. The Legal Status of Preembryos: Legislative and Judicial
Responses to In Vitro Fertilization
To date, Louisiana has the most comprehensive and restric-
tive set of laws regarding the products of in vitro fertilization.9 1
First and foremost, Louisiana's statute proclaims that a viable
preembryo is a "juridical person which shall not be intentionally
destroyed ... ."92 The statute entitles an in vitro fertilized
ovum to sue or be sued,9 3 and provides that such an ovum is not
the property of the physician, IVF clinic, or the gamete donors.9 4
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 593. See also John A. Robertson, In The Beginning: The
Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REv. 437 (1990).
83. Kaplan, supra note 14, at 728.
84. Id.
85. STEADMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 375 (25th ed. 1990).
86. See Robertson, supra note 77, at 286-87.
87. Board of Trustees Report, Frozen Pre-Embryos, JAMA, May 9, 1990, at
2484-87.
88. Id.
89. See Dodson et al., supra note 73, at 102. One clinic reported 14
pregnancies out of 110 attempts, yielding a pregnancy rate of 13 percent per
laparoscopy. However, other clinics have reported a 30 to 40 percent success rate.
Id.
90. Id. at 103.
91. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:121-33 (West 1991).
92. Id. § 9:129. The statute defines a non-viable in vitro fertilized human
ovum as one "that fails to develop further over a thirty-six hour period except when
the embryo is in a state of cryopreservation." Id.
93. Id. § 9:124.
94. Id. §§ 9:126, 130.
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Under the Louisiana statute, a guardian may be appointed to
safeguard a fertilized ovum's legal rights.95 Finally, the Louisi-
ana statute requires that all preembryos be transferred to a
uterus. 96 The IVF participants are thus, in effect, required to
choose between undergoing implantation themselves, or al-
lowing their preembryos to be "adopted."97
The Uniform Parentage Act, created in 1973 by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
was created to address the legal implications of children born
out of wedlock.98 The Act "does not deal with many complex and
serious legal problems raised by the practice of artificial insemi-
nation."99 However, the Act does state that: "The donor of se-
men provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial
insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child
thereby conceived." 100 This Act has been adopted by eighteen
states, 10 1 including California. 10 2 One court has determined
that the purpose of Section 7005103 of California's Parentage Act
95. Id. Section 126 provides: "[i]f the in vitro fertilization patients fail to ex-
press their identity, then the physician shall be deemed to be temporary guardian
of the in vitro fertilized human ovum until adoptive implantation can occur. A
court... may appoint a curator, upon motion of the in vitro fertilization patients,
their heirs, or physicians who cause in vitro fertilization to be performed, to protect
the in vitro fertilized human ovum's rights." Id.
96. Id. § 9:129-30. "If the in vitro fertilization parents renounce, by notarial
act, their parental rights for in utero implantation, then the in vitro fertilized
human ovum shall be available for adoptive implantation .... " Id. § 9:130.
97. Id. The statute therefore eliminates one's ability to avoid genetic
parenthood, a right which the Davis court held to be at least as fundamental as
one's right to become a parent. See infra part III.D.3.
98. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1973).
99. Id. § 5, cmt., at 302.
100. Id. § 5(b), at 301.
101. The Act has been adopted by Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware,
Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1973 & Supp. 1993). New
Hampshire's statute has an effect similar to that of the Uniform Parentage Act,
creating a presumption of fatherhood for the unmarried donor of sperm only when
he and the unmarried recipient of the sperm agree in writing, prior to in vitro
fertilization, that the donor shall be the father. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-
B:3(I)(e) (Supp. 1993). See generally N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B (Supp. 1993),
which addresses all surrogacy matters.
102. CAL. ClV. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West 1987).
103. Id. § 7005 (Section 7005 is derived almost verbatim from Section 5 of the
Uniform Parentage Act).
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was to provide a method for a semen donor to avoid the legal
consequences dictated by traditional notions of paternity. 10 4
However, the importance of the Uniform Parentage Act to this
article is that, once a semen donor voluntarily gives his genetic
material which is used to fertilize an ovum, the donor has no
right to prevent the gestation and birth of the fertilized ovum.
Thus, genetic parenthood would in fact be imposed upon the do-
nor to the same extent as in the case at bar.
Virginia is one state that has not adopted the Uniform Par-
entage Act. 0 5 Thus, in Virginia, gamete donors who are not the
intended parents of the in vitro fertilization process may still
have parental rights or duties with respect to a resulting
child.106 In addition, preembryos are considered the property of
the gamete-donors, and the IVF clinic's legal rights and duties
with respect to the gamete-donors are those of a bailee. 07
In general, legislatures have been slow to deal with the is-
sues presented by IVF. However, it can be expected that as IVF
clinics proliferate, more disputes will arise and be taken to the
courts. Legislation will inevitably follow.
III. Davis v. Davis
A. Facts
This case began as a custody dispute arising from the di-
vorce proceedings between Mary Sue and Junior Davis.108 Prior
to their divorce, the Davises had repeatedly attempted to con-
104. See Jhordan C. v. Mary K, 179 Cal. Rptr. 530, 537 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
105. Welborn v. Doe, 394 S.E.2d 732, 734 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).
106. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-257(D) (Michie 1992). Under the statute, a child
born to a married woman who conceived the child using artificial insemination
with the written consent of her husband shall be considered the legitimate natural
child of both the woman and her husband. Id. See Welborn v. Doe, 394 S.E.2d 732
(Va. Ct. App. 1990), where the husband of a woman who had been artificially in-
seminated by the sperm of an anonymous donor sought to adopt the resulting
twins. Id. at 733. The court held that the Virginia statute did not terminate the
natural father's (sperm-donor's) rights, absent adoption by the husband. Id. Thus
the court determined that, "[u]ntil such time as the Code is amended to terminate
possible parental rights of a sperm donor, only through adoption may the rights of
the sperm donor be divested . . . ." Id. at 734.
107. See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989), where the court held
that the IVF gamete-donors had the right to order inter-institutional transfer of
their preembryo to California, where they had relocated. Id. at 427.
108. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992).
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ceive a child. ' 0 9 Mary Sue suffered five painful pregnancies and,
as a result, elected to have her fallopian tube ligated, which pre-
vented her from conceiving naturally." 0 The couple thereafter
decided to adopt a child."' Due to unexpected difficulties, how-
ever, this route also proved fruitless.1 2 This led the couple to
attempt to achieve pregnancy through in vitro fertilization.1 3
The Davises unsuccessfully attempted IVF six times, 114
which cost the couple considerable expense" 5 and Mrs. Davis a
significant amount of pain. 1 6 In November of 1988, the possi-
bility of cryogenically preserving" 7 preembryos became avail-
able to the Davises." 8 The Davises' IVF clinic successfully
brought nine zygotes to the four- to eight-cell stage, and trans-
ferred two to Mrs. Davis while freezing the rest.1" 9 As with the
previous six attempts, the transfers were unsuccessful. Before
another transfer was attempted, Mr. Davis filed for divorce. 20
The contested issue in the divorce was the disposition of the
remaining seven preembryos. 121 Mr. Davis originally "preferred
to leave the embryos in their frozen state until he decided
whether or not he wanted to become a parent outside the
bounds of marriage." 22 Mrs. Davis, however, wished to con-
tinue to attempt to achieve pregnancy herself with the
embryos.123
109. Id. at 591.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. The couple paid the medical expenses of a pregnant woman willing to
give her child up for adoption. Id. However, upon delivery the woman elected to
keep her child. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. The total cost of the six attempts was $35,000. Id.
116. Id. at 591-92.
117. The process of cryopreservation involves the freezing of the conceptive
product in nitrogen and storing at sub-zero temperatures. Id. at 592. See supra
notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
118. 842 S.W.2d at 592.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 589.
122. Id.
123. Id.
19941
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B. Trial Court
The Tennessee circuit court held that temporary custody of
the preembryos should be vested in Mrs. Davis for the purpose
of implantation. 124 In making its decision, the court determined
that 1) human life begins at conception; 125 2) the doctrine of
parens patriae126 applies to in vitro embryos; 127 and 3) it was in
the best interest of the in vitro embryos to be brought to term
through implantation. 28 The court reserved the matters of sup-
port, visitation, and final custody until the time at which one or
more of the preembryos achieved live birth. 29 Mr. Davis ap-
pealed the trial court's decision.
C. Tennessee Court of Appeals
The Tennessee Court of Appeals modified the trial court's
holding and granted the Davises joint custody over the preem-
bryos. 30 Significantly, at the time of the appellate decision both
parties had remarried, and Mrs. Davis (now Mrs. Stowe) wished
to donate the embryos to a childless couple rather than undergo
implantation herself.131
The appellate court stated that the United States Supreme
Court "has clearly held that an individual has a right to prevent
procreation. 'The decision whether to bear or beget a child is a
constitutionally protected choice.'" 3 2 The court then analyzed
fetal rights under Roe v. Wade, 33 which held that in the first
trimester of pregnancy a woman has the absolute right to termi-
124. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *11 (Tenn. Cir. Ct.
Sept. 21, 1989).
125. Id. at *9
126. The doctrine of parens patriae is used in child custody determinations to
refer to the role of the state in protecting the interests of the child. BLACK'S LAW
DIcTIoNARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
127. Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *10.
128. Id. at *11.
129. Id.
130. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).
131. Id. at *1 n.1. Although Mrs. Davis' name is now Mrs. Stowe, she will be
referred to as Mrs. Davis throughout the entire article to maintain continuity and
clarity.
132. Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *2 (quoting In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 822
(Colo. 1990) (citing Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Ei-
senstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972))); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
133. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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nate her pregnancy. 34 In addition, the court noted that the
Tennessee abortion statutes "demonstrate[d] even more explic-
itly that viable fetuses in the womb are not entitled to the same
protection as 'persons.'"135 The court also examined Tennes-
see's wrongful death statute, 136 which does not allow a wrongful
death action for a viable fetus not yet born alive. 137 The court
concluded: "On the facts of this case, it would be repugnant and
offensive to constitutional principles to order Mary Sue to im-
plant these fertilized ova against her will. It would be equally
repugnant to order Junior to bear the psychological, if not legal,
consequences of paternity against his will."138 Thus, the court
awarded joint custody of the preembryos to the parties. 139 Mrs.
Davis appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court, contesting the
court of appeals' constitutional basis for its decision. 40
D. Tennessee Supreme Court
The issue of whether there exists a constitutional right to
avoid genetic parenthood after gamete donation was one of first
impression."41 The Tennessee Supreme Court noted that no
guiding caselaw existed despite the fact that approximately
134. Id. at 163. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
135. Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *2. The Tennessee abortion statute, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-15-201(c) (1992), states in pertinent part that:
[n]o person is guilty of a criminal abortion or an attempt to procure criminal
miscarriage when an abortion or an attempt to procure a miscarriage is per-
formed under the following circumstances: (1) During the first three (3)
months of pregnancy... (2) After three (3) months, but before viability of
the fetus... (3) During the viability of the fetus, if the abortion.., is neces-
sary to preserve the life or health of the mother ....
Id.
136. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106 (1980).
137. Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *2. Tennessee statutes that protect viable
fetuses without requiring a subsequent birth include TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
107 (1992) (assault), TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-214 (1991) (criminal homicide), and
TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106(b) (1980) (injury resulting in death).
138. Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *3.
139. Id. Because frozen preembryos can only survive up to two years before
implantation, "the true effect of the intermediate court's opinion [was] to confer on
Junior Davis the inherent power to veto any transfer of the preembryos... and
thus to insure their eventual discard or self-destruction." Davis, 842 S.W.2d at
598.
140. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.
141. Id.
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20,000 "frozen embryos" were in storage in the United States. 142
There did exist, however, numerous articles written by medical-
legal scholars and ethicists concerning the disposition of cry-
ogenically-preserved embryos. 143 After briefly reviewing the
theories presented by these articles, the court concluded that
each theory proposed a bright-line rule which should not be
adopted, 144 given the relevant federal and state constitutional
principles, 45 Tennessee public policy with respect to unborn
life, 46 scientific knowledge and emerging reproductive technolo-
gies, 47 and ethical considerations. 48 The court concluded that
resolving the issue fairly and responsibly required weighing the
relative interests of each party to the dispute. 149
The Davis court first addressed the question of whether the
products of IVF should be termed "preembryos" or "embryos." 50
The court agreed with expert testimony that "the currently ac-
cepted term for the zygote immediately after division is 'preem-
bryo' and that this term applies up until fourteen days after
142. Id.
143. Id. at 590-91. The court cited various articles presenting models for the
disposition of frozen embryos. See Colleen M. Browne & Brian J. Hynes, Note, The
Legal Status of Frozen Embryos: Analysis and Proposed Guidelines for a Uniform
Law, 17 J. LEGIS. 97 (1990) (illustrating extreme rules that either require that all
embryos be used by the gamete-providers or donated for uterine transfer, or that
any unused embryos be automatically discarded); John A. Robertson, Resolving
Disputes Over Frozen Embryos, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 7
(describing the "sweat equity" model which would automatically vest control in
female gamete-donor, because of her greater involvement in the IVF process); Lori
B. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 Loy. L. REv. 357, 401-08 (1986)
(supporting the vesting of control in the female donor when she desires to implant
herself). Other models would assume implied contracts to procreate from partici-
pation in the IVF procedure, and would either give the IVF clinic the decision-
making authority, or would require transfer into the female donor or a donee. One
model would divide the preembryos equally between the donors (the court deemed
this theory to be "the worst of both worlds" for the Davises, because both parties
would then be dissatisfied, Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591 n.6). Yet another model
would give the preembryos to the party wishing to avoid procreation. Elisa K.
Poole, Allocation of Decision-Making Rights to Frozen Embryos, 4 Am. J. FAM. L. 67
(1990).
144. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591.
145. See infra part III.D.3.
146. See infra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
147. See infra part III.D.1.
148. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 592-93.
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fertilization. ' 151 After fourteen days, the cells comprising the
preembryo begin to differentiate. 152 While noting that the se-
mantical distinction was not dispositive, it was important to the
court because "inaccuracy can lead to misanalysis such as oc-
curred at the trial level." 53
1. Is An Eight-Celled Frozen Preembryo a "Person" or
"Property"?
The Tennessee Supreme Court responded to the request
made by the American Fertility Society and nineteen other na-
tional organizations as amici curiae to address the issue of
whether preembryos should legally be considered "persons" or
"property,"5 4 despite the fact that a preembryo could not be con-
sidered a person under Tennessee law155 or federal law. 56 The
court analyzed three major ethical positions articulated by the
American Fertility Society regarding preembryos. 5 7 The first
was the view that the preembryo is a human immediately upon
fertilization, and thus must be accorded the rights of a per-
son. 58 The court rejected this view, noting that such a view
would impose a duty to provide an opportunity for implantation
151. Id. at 593.
152. Id.
The stage subsequent to the zygote is cleavage, during which the single ini-
tial cell undergoes successive equal divisions with little or no intervening
growth.... After three such divisions, the aggregate contains eight cells in
relatively loose association . .. [Each blastomere, if separated from the
others, has the potential to develop into a complete adult .... Stated an-
other way, at the 8-cell stage, the developmental singleness of one person
has not been established.
Id.
153. Id. at 594. The trial court had treated the preembryos as "children in
vitro" to reach the conclusion that it was in the best interest of the 'children" to be
born. Id.
154. Id.
155. The court noted that preembryos could not be considered "persons" under
Tennessee law because a wrongful death action did not exist for a viable fetus not
first born alive, and because Tennessee's legislature had adopted the Roe trimester
approach to abortion. Id. at 594-95.
156. Id. at 595. The court stated that the United States Supreme Court ex-
plicitly refused to recognize independent fetal rights in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). This conclusion, the Davis court stated, had "never been seriously chal-
lenged." Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595.
157. Id. at 596.
158. Id.
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to every preembryo. 159 This view would also tend to prohibit
any actions that might harm a preembryo before transfer, such
as cryopreservation. 160
The second view, also rejected by the court, was that the
preembryo is no different from other human tissue, and there-
fore no limits should be imposed upon those with decision-mak-
ing authority over the preembryo. 161 The third position,
adopted by the Davis court, was that "the preembryo deserves
respect greater than that accorded to human tissue but not the
respect accorded to actual persons." 6 2 The rationale behind
this view is that a preembryo possesses the potential for human
life, which other human tissue does not possess, yet a preem-
bryo may not realize its human potential. 63
2. The Enforceability of Contract
The court next addressed 1) whether the Davises could
have executed a valid contingency agreement prior to in vitro
fertilization, and if so 2) whether such an agreement would be
enforceable.' 64 The court stated that "an agreement regarding
disposition of any untransferred preembryos in the event of con-
tingencies (such as the death of one or more of the parties, di-
vorce, financial reversals, or abandonment of the program)
should be presumed valid and should be enforced as between
the progenitors."' 65 This ruling, stated the court, was in accord-
ance with the notion that gamete-donors should retain decision-
making authority over their genetic material that had created a
preembryo. 66 In a footnote, Justice Daughtrey distinguished
an IVF contingency agreement from an agreement regarding
abortion, which would be "unenforceable because of the wo-
man's right to privacy and autonomy."167
While recognizing the validity of IVF contingency agree-
ments, the court noted that the emotional nature of infertility
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 597.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. n.20 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)).
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and IVF rendered "informed consent" nearly impossible.168
Such consent would "often not be truly informed because of the
near impossibility of anticipating, emotionally and psychologi-
cally, all the turns that events may take as the IVF process un-
folds." 169 Thus, the court ruled that if an initial agreement
allowed for later modification "by agreement," the initial agree-
ment would be binding. 70
The court refused to find that the Davises had an implied
contract to reproduce through IVF.' 7' Further, the court pos-
ited that, were the roles of the parties reversed, Mr. Davis could
not force Mrs. Davis to undergo implantation herself, because of
her "absolute right" to terminate any resulting pregnancy in the
first trimester. 72 Therefore, because the court did not find an
agreement between the parties to honor, the court was forced to
examine the substantive rights of the parties.
3. The Right To Procreational Autonomy
The court then addressed what it termed "the essential dis-
pute: whether the parties [would] become parents."173 The de-
termination of this issue, according to the court, rested on the
parties' constitutional right to privacy. 174 The term "privacy,"
explained the court, was grounded in the concept of liberty em-
bodied in both the federal and Tennessee constitutions.175 The
court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of lib-
erty "denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual... to marry, establish a home and
bring up children," 76 as well as "the right to be let alone." 77
168. Id. at 597.
169. Id.
170. Id. The court did not explain this requirement further. The requirement
that an agreement would be valid only if it could later be modified by agreement
seems illusory, because any agreement may be modified by a subsequent agree-
ment between the parties.
171. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598.
172. Id. at 598 n.21.
173. Id. at 598.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 599 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
177. Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting)).
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The court recognized that the concept of liberty played "a
central role" in the Tennessee Constitution 17 8 and in several
sections of the Tennessee Declaration of Rights. 179 Thus, the
court held that "[i]n terms of the Tennessee State Constitution,
... the right of procreation is a vital part of an individual's right
to privacy." 80 "Federal law," stated the court, "is to the same
effect."181
The Davis court acknowledged that the United States
Supreme Court had "never addressed the issue of procreation in
the context of in vitro fertilization." 18 2 The court further noted
that, although the right to procreational autonomy is implicit in
cases involving reproductive freedom and parental rights, the
"extent to which procreational autonomy is protected by the
United States Constitution is no longer entirely clear .... The
Webster opinion lends even less guidance to those seeking the
bounds of constitutional protection of other aspects of procrea-
tional autonomy."1 83 The court then stated:
[flor the purposes of this litigation it is sufficient to note that,
whatever its ultimate constitutional boundaries, the right of
procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal signifi-
cance-the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation.
Undoubtedly, both are subject to protections and limitations. 184
The court reasoned that "the equivalence of and inherent ten-
sion between" the two rights is more noticeable in the context of
in vitro fertilization because "none of the concerns about a wo-
man's bodily integrity that have previously precluded men from
controlling abortion decisions" are applicable. 8 5 The court
178. Id. "Indeed, the notion of individual liberty is so deeply embedded in the
Tennessee Constitution that it, alone among American constitutions, gives the
people, in the face of governmental oppression and interference with liberty, the
right to resist that oppression even to the extent of overthrowing the government."
Id.
179. Id. at 600. The court cited Section 3 of the Tennessee Declaration of
Rights (freedom to worship), Section 7 (forbidding unreasonable searches and
seizures), Section 19 (freedom of speech and press), and Section 27 (prohibiting the
quartering of soldiers without a homeowner's consent).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 601.
183. Id. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
184. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601 (emphasis added).
185. Id. The court noted that the IVF process was more traumatic, emotion-
ally and physically, for a woman than for a man. Id. Nevertheless, stated the
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therefore determined that the Davises must be viewed as "en-
tirely equivalent gamete-providers." 186
The court noted that the mere existence of the right of
procreational autonomy dictated that gamete-donors have sole
decisional -authority over their preembryos, "at least to the ex-
tent that their decisions have an impact upon their individual
reproductive status."187 Therefore, "no other person or entity
has an interest sufficient to permit interference with the gam-
ete-providers' decision to continue or terminate the IVF process,
because no one else bears the consequences of these decisions in
the way that the gamete-providers do." 8 8 The court further em-
phasized that neither Tennessee's statutes nor its constitution
asserted an interest in potential life sufficient to justify infring-
ing upon the gamete-donor's procreational autonomy. 8 9
Although Webster, and even Roe, permitted a state's interest in
potential human life to infringe upon an individual's procrea-
tional autonomy, 90 Tennessee had not asserted such a
"weighty" state interest. 19' Moreover, if a state's interest in po-
tential life could not become sufficiently compelling in the abor-
tion context until after the first trimester, any state interest in
four- to eight-cell preembryos would have to be, at best,
"slight."192
Finally, the court turned to the relative interests of the par-
ties to the action. 93 Whereas courts had previously dealt with
the "child-bearing and child-rearing aspects of parenthood," as
well as "gestational parenthood," the Davis court was faced with
the issue of "genetic parenthood." 9 4 The court concluded "that
an interest in avoiding genetic parenthood can be significant
enough to trigger the protections afforded to all other aspects of
court, the traumatic experience of IVF "must be viewed in light of the joys of
parenthood that is desired or the relative anguish of a lifetime of unwanted
parenthood." Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 602.
188. Id.
189. Id. See infra notes 214-23 and accompanying text.
190. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 602-03.
194. Id. at 603.
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parenthood." 95 Despite the fact that someone else would ges-
tate the preembryos and raise any resulting children as their
own, the gamete-donors would still become parents "in the ge-
netic sense."'196 The court noted that a sperm donor might re-
gret not having contact with his biological children, 197 and that
a woman who had surrendered her children for adoption could
be "haunted by concern about the child." 98 These "profound im-
pacts" upon the gamete-donors supported the retention of "sole
decisional authority" in the gamete-donors. 199
4. Balancing the Parties' Interests
The Davis court reiterated that the circumstances necessi-
tated a balancing of two constitutionally protected rights: "the
right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation." 200 With
respect to Junior Davis, the court expressed concern that if the
preembryos were brought to term, it would "impose unwanted
parenthood on him, with all of its possible financial and psycho-
logical consequences." 201 On the other hand, a failure to at-
tempt to bring the preembryos to term would impose on Mrs.
Davis "the burden of knowing that the lengthy IVF procedures
she underwent were futile, and that the preembryos to which
she contributed genetic material would never become chil-
dren."20 2 Noting that this effect upon Mrs. Davis was "not an
insubstantial emotional burden," the court concluded that Mr.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. n.28.
198. Id. at 603 (citing Elisa K. Poole, Allocating of Decision-Making Rights to
Frozen Embryos, 4 AM. J. FAm. L. 67, 74 (1990)).
199. Id. at 603.
200. Id.
201. Id. The court then analyzed the particular psychological circumstances
of Mr. Davis. He had come from a broken home, and testified that the separation
from his parents had caused him severe problems when he was a child. Id. at 604.
Mr. Davis was therefore strongly opposed to fathering a child that would not live
with both of its parents. Id. Furthermore, Mr. Davis did not want "his" child liv-
ing in a single-parent home, which might occur if an embryo was donated to a
couple that subsequently divorced. Id. The court stated that if the preembryos
were donated to another couple, Mr. Davis "would face a lifetime of either wonder-
ing about his parental status or knowing about his parental status but having no
control over it." Id. Mr. Davis testified that if the preembryos "were brought to
term, he would fight for custody of his child or children." Id.
202. 842 S.W.2d at 603.
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Davis's interest in avoiding procreation was stronger than Mrs.
Davis's countervailing interest.2 3 However, the court acknowl-
edged that:
[t]he case would be closer if Mary Sue Davis were seeking to use
the preembryos herself, but only if she could not achieve
parenthood by any other reasonable means.., she would have a
reasonable opportunity, through IVF, to try once again to achieve
parenthood in all its aspects-genetic, gestational, bearing, and
rearing. Further, we note that if Mary Sue Davis were unable to
undergo another round of lVF, or opted not to try, she could still
achieve the child-rearing aspects of parenthood through adoption.
The fact that she and Junior Davis pursued adoption indicates
that, at least at one time, she was willing to forego genetic
parenthood and would have been satisfied by the child-rearing as-
pects of parenthood alone.20 4
The court held that if no prior agreement governing the dis-
position of IVF preembryos existed between gamete-donors, the
relative interests of the parties must be weighed. 205 However,
continued the court, the party wishing to avoid procreation
should normally prevail, if the other party has a "reasonable
possibility" of achieving parenthood by other means. 206 Only
when no reasonable alternative of achieving parenthood exists
for the party desiring parenthood should a court consider that
party's argument.20 7 Where "the party seeking control of the
preembryos intends merely to donate them to another couple,
the objecting party obviously has the greater interest and
should prevail."208 The Tennessee Supreme Court therefore af-
firmed the judgment of the court of appeals. 20 9
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. However, the court stated that its ruling did not create an automatic
veto over the party wishing to procreate and should not be interpreted as doing so.
Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. Thus the Knoxville Fertility Clinic was "free to follow its normal pro-
cedure in dealing with unused preembryos, as long as that procedure [was] not in
conflict with [the] opinion." Id. at 605. The procedure of the fertility clinic was to
donate surplus preembryos to other couples. Davis v. Davis, No. 34, 1992 WL
341632, at *1 (Tenn. 1992). Because this was not consistent with the Davis deci-
sion, the Tennessee Supreme Court subsequently ordered that the preembryos be
either donated for approved research or discarded. Id.
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IV. Analysis
In Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized a con-
stitutional right to avoid genetic parenthood after conception.
As the Davis court acknowledged, this right had never been ex-
plicitly recognized in a court of law. It is this author's conten-
tion that the current United States Supreme Court would most
likely refuse to recognize such a right.210
The decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey211 reveals that
the Supreme Court would disagree with the Davis court, should
the proper case for review arise. Although the Supreme Court
recognized in Casey that states have an interest in the potential
lives of fetuses from the moment of conception, 212 the Court
ruled that this interest is not compelling enough to override a
woman's right to abort a fetus before viability.21 3 However, it is
quite likely that, given the absence of the issue of a woman's
bodily integrity and the absence of the liberty interests involved
in traditional parenthood, the Court would likely hold that a
state's interest in potential life could constitutionally override
any interest a gamete donor may have in avoiding genetic
parenthood.
In reaffirming the central holding of Roe, the Casey Court
recognized that a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy
210. The Davis decision is flawed in several respects that are not addressed in
this analysis. For instance, with respect to contingency agreements between gam-
ete-donors, the court stated that such agreements would be honored, provided that
there was an opportunity to modify the agreement by subsequent agreement. See
supra note 170 and accompanying text. It is unclear what the court meant by this
as all legal contracts can be subsequently modified by the parties thereto. See
JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAw OF CONRACTS § 5-14 (3d ed.
1987).
Further, the Davis court stated that its determination did not create an auto-
matic veto over the party wishing to achieve parenthood. See supra note 207. Yet
given the language of the court, it is difficult to imagine when the party wishing to
achieve parenthood could ever prevail.
Finally, the court stated boldly that the mere existence of the right of procrea-
tional autonomy dictated that gamete-donors have sole decisional authority over
their preembryos. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602. Not only was this assertion unsup-
ported, but it was contrary to the Supreme Court's language in Roe that the consti-
tutional right of procreational privacy must be balanced with any countervailing
interest. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
211. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
212. Id. at 2804.
213. Id.
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is a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.214 Although the Court stated that
it was settled law "that the Constitution places limits upon a
state's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions
about family as well as bodily integrity,"215 the Court noted that
the Roe definition of liberty was "still questioned."216 The lib-
erty element of due process is not absolute, reminded the Court,
but rather, a "balance which our Nation... has struck between
that liberty and the demands of organized society."217 Thus, the
Court, confronted with a Davis situation, would balance the lib-
erty of a gamete-donor with the "demands of organized society."
What those "demands" are is debatable; however, a state's as-
serted interest in an in vitro fertilized preembryo is clearly
identical to a state's interest in a preembryo in the abortion con-
text. Therefore, if the Court determined, as the Davis court did,
that the liberty interest of avoiding genetic parenthood after
conception is equivalent to a woman's liberty interest in abort-
ing her fetus before viability, the viability cutoff and "undue
burden" standard of Casey would protect a gamete-donor's deci-
sion not to bring a preembryo to term. 218 .
The query therefore remains: what is the liberty interest at
stake in Davis, and is it as great as the other liberty interests
already recognized by the Court, i.e., "marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and educa-
tion?"21 9 The Davis court implicitly determined that "family"
and "procreation" encompass the specific right to avoid genetic
parenthood after conception. However, the Supreme Court
cases relied upon by Davis focus upon either a woman's right of
bodily integrity and autonomy, or traditional parenthood and
the protection of major life decisions regarding whether or not
214. Id. The Court also relied upon principles of institutional integrity and
stare decisis in its reaffirmance of Roe. Id. Because the issue presented to the
Davis court has never been directly addressed by the United States Supreme
Court, only the first ground for the reaffirmance of Roe has a bearing upon whether
the Supreme Court would recognize a constitutional right to avoid genetic
parenthood after conception.
215. Id. at 2806.
216. Id. at 2803.
217. Id. at 2806 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds)).
218. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
219. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
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to become a traditional parent and start a family. Casey, while
protecting such life decisions, reveals the Court's respect for a
state's interest in unborn life. Thus, although the Casey Court
used strong language regarding procreational privacy, it seems
that this language was simply used as a justification for the re-
affirmance of Roe, a result which was in large part attributed by
the Court to stare decisis and the institutional integrity of the
Court.
2 2 0
"Parenthood" is typically viewed as an aggregate of rights
and responsibilities with respect to a child.221 Advances in med-
ical technology and changes in the family structure have tested
the traditional notion of parenthood, as the bundle of rights and
duties that comprise parenthood have slowly become distin-
guished and separated. This poses the question of whether the
constitutional protection that has typically been accorded to
"parenthood" in the aggregate should also apply to each one of
the sticks in the bundle, including genetic parenthood. The Da-
vis court held that full constitutional protection should be given
to genetic parenthood, even when isolated from the other as-
pects of parenthood.222 The Casey decision, decided shortly af-
ter Davis, reveals that the Supreme Court would probably
disagree with the Davis court.
In further support of this contention is the fact that the
right to avoid genetic parenthood after conception has tradition-
ally not been afforded constitutional protection. While the issue
has only arisen in the abortion/pregnancy context, where a wo-
man's right to bodily integrity and decisional autonomy over-
ride a man's right to avoid genetic parenthood, 223 women have
historically been able to force genetic parenthood upon men by
electing to give birth to a jointly-conceived child. 224 Women
have had this ability even where a man had not intended to con-
ceive a child. In contrast, IVF sperm-donors intend to donate
220. See supra notes 56-72 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 8.
222. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588.
223. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
224. Further, women have historically been able to enforce more than just
genetic parenthood upon men. With a successful paternity suit, women have been
able to impose financial support upon the genetic father of their children as well.
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note, § 3, § 6, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1973 & Supp.
1993).
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their gametes for the purpose of creating children. Thus, one
could argue that forced genetic parenthood in the IVF context is
a lesser constitutional intrusion than when a woman has a
man's child against his will, because in the IVF context the
gamete-donor initially possessed absolute decision-making
authority.
Interestingly, the constitutionality of compelling the adop-
tion of preembryos and enforcing subsequent genetic
parenthood as Louisiana has done has not been challenged in
the courts. 225 This author suggests that the Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari on the Davis case because Tennessee had not as-
serted an interest in the Davis' preembryos. 226 However, it is
likely that if a state asserts its interest in potential life from the
point of conception, and the only countervailing interest
asserted is the right of a gamete-donor to avoid genetic
parenthood, the Court would weigh the state's interest more
heavily. 227
225. But see Kim Schaefer, In Vitro Fertilization, Frozen Embryos, And The
Right To Privacy-Are Mandatory Donation Laws Constitutional?, 22 PAC. L. J. 87
(1990) (arguing that statutes such as Louisiana's are unconstitutional because
there is a privacy right to avoid biological children as long as states do not have a
compelling interest in protecting an embryo); Christi D. Ahnen, Disputes over Fro-
zen Embryos: Who Wins, Who Loses, and How Do We Decide? - An Analysis of
Davis v. Davis, York v. Jones, and State Statutes Affecting Reproductive Choices,
24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1299 (1991) (arguing that the choice of whether to bear
unwanted children, accept implantation of a dangerous number of embryos, accept
implantation and then incur the risks of abortion, or give the embryos up for adop-
tion places a substantial burden upon the gamete-donors and is discriminatory
because fertile couples who conceive naturally do not have to make such choices).
226. The Davis court held that Tennessee's lack of assertion of an interest in
the four- to eight-cell preembryos could not override the Davis' interests in
procreational autonomy. But the court also made it clear that even if Tennessee
had asserted such an interest, it could not have overridden the Davis' constitution-
ally protected rights. Although the Davis court addressed Tennessee law, much of
its decision was based upon the federal constitutional right to privacy, as defined
by the Supreme Court's procreational privacy decisions. This is so despite the fact
that the Davis court recognized that "the extent to which procreational autonomy
is protected by the United States Constitution is no longer entirely clear." Davis,
842 S.W.2d at 601.
227. Of course, in such a situation the state would be faced with difficulties
such as the impossibility of bringing all unwanted preembryos to term. Perhaps
most states would choose not to assert any interest in the unwanted preembryos,
and delegate their decision-making authority to gamete-donors.
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V. Conclusion
The ethical dilemmas created by in vitro fertilization, while
involving some of the rights present in abortion decisions, ne-
cessitate a redefining of the constitutional right to procreate
and a determination of whether or not there exists a fundamen-
tal right to avoid genetic parenthood after the intentional dona-
tion of genetic material. The Davis decision brought into the
limelight an aspect of parenthood that had never been directly
considered by a court, and afforded great constitutional protec-
tion to that aspect of parenthood. The Casey decision indicates
that the United States Supreme Court would not be so
generous.
Leanne E. Murray*
* Dedicated to my parents, Merrie and Jim Murray, and to David.
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